Peirce and Wittgenstein on Doubt: A Comparison by Menary, Richard
  230 
Peirce and Wittgenstein on Doubt: A Comparison 
Richard Menary, Hatfield  
1. Introduction 
There are many areas of Peirce and Wittgenstein’s thought 
which have great affinity for one another such as: the 
impossibility of a private language, the distinction between 
believing and knowing, and the role of doubt and certainty 
in our epistemic practices. I shall focus on the affinity 
between Peirce and Wittgenstein’s thought on the role of 
doubt in our epistemic practices. I will argue that Peirce 
and Wittgenstein give us a ‘broadly’ pragmatic account of 
the role of doubt and by this I mean, they are interested in 
the difference doubt makes to our epistemic practices (I do 
not mean by this that Wittgenstein is part of a philosophical 
movement called pragmatism). Specifically, Peirce and 
Wittgenstein argue against the skeptical, or Cartesian, 
form of doubt that has dominated epistemological discus-
sion. They deny that universal doubt is a genuine doubt; 
such a ‘doubt’ is idle, because it does not have any prac-
tical consequences for us. Genuine doubt must have a 
ground and of course there is no rule that can determine 
whether a ground for doubt is genuine in all circumstan-
ces. Doubts occur in a context, with all our prejudices and 
beliefs in place. 
2. Universal Doubt Is Not A Genuine Doubt 
One aspect of Peirce’s conception of doubt is his persis-
tent rejection of Descartes’ universal doubt and his use of 
universal doubt to further his epistemological ends. 
Peirce’s famous statement of his rejection of universal 
doubt and the Cartesian method of doubting occurs in his 
1868 paper Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. 
“We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin 
with all the prejudices which we actually have when we 
enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices 
are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things 
which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence 
this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and 
not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian 
method will ever be satisfied until he has formally 
recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given 
up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to 
the North Pole would be in order to get to Constantin-
ople by coming down regularly upon a meridian. A 
person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find 
reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that 
case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, 
and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not 
pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in 
our hearts.” (CP: 5.265)1 
And again in his 1878 paper The Fixation of Belief: 
“Some philosophers have imagined that to start an 
inquiry it was only necessary to utter a question whether 
orally or by setting it down upon paper, and have even 
recommended us to begin our studies with questioning 
everything! But the mere putting of a proposition into the 
interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any 
                                                     
1 All references to Peirce are taken from The Collected Papers. The standard 
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struggle after belief. There must be a real and living 
doubt, and without this all discussion is idle.” (CP: 2.376) 
The mere utterance of a doubt is not sufficient for there to 
be a real doubt. Descartes claims to doubt all his beliefs, 
but it does not follow that he really does doubt them. This 
is a doubt that makes no difference to our practices and 
beliefs. Wittgenstein concurs: 
 “115. If you tried to doubt everything you would not get 
as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself 
presupposes certainty.”  
“450. A doubt that doubted everything would not be a 
doubt.”2  
These statements also indicate that Peirce and Wittgen-
stein share the claim that our ability to doubt rests upon 
beliefs and practices which are themselves not open to 
doubt. Furthermore, such attempts to doubt “what it does 
not occur to us can be doubted,” are merely idle: 
“119. But can it also be said: Everything speaks for, and 
nothing against the table’s still being there when no one 
sees it? For what does speak for it? 
120. But if anyone were to doubt it, how would his doubt 
come out in practice? And couldn’t we peacefully leave 
him to doubt it, since it makes no difference at all?” 
Here again we can see that Peirce and Wittgenstein share 
the claim that, a genuine doubt must have consequences 
for our actions and beliefs, it is not sufficient to merely 
announce a doubt, as if doing so gave it authority over all 
our beliefs and practices. A genuine doubt must have 
practical consequences, it must, for example, stimulate us 
to inquiry. But now we need to see how Peirce and 
Wittgenstein think that we can identify a genuine doubt. 
3. Genuine Doubt Must Have A Ground 
The general doubt of Cartesianism cannot be the basis for 
inquiry, if I doubt that there is such a place as Cumberland 
Lodge, because of the possible existence of an evil 
Demon, I am not giving a specific reason for doubting the 
existence of the place - such as the Lodge burned down 
last year. If I doubt that Cumberland Lodge exists because 
of the possibility of an evil demon, then how can I show 
you that the Lodge does exist, how can inquiry proceed? 
Alternatively, if I doubt that there is such a place as 
Cumberland Lodge because it burned down, then I can 
proceed with an inquiry to determine whether or not the 
reason for my doubt is a good one. With the general doubt 
we have no way of determining whether the reason for 
doubt is a good one by a process of inquiry, and this is 
because we have no way to proceed in our inquiry from 
the starting point of general doubt. Peirce is here claiming 
that a possible doubt is not a real one; Descartes 
supposes that he can doubt that he is sitting next to the 
fire, or Cumberland Lodge does not exist, but it does not 
mean that he does.  
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In genuine inquiry we reject a belief, not because it is 
possible to doubt a belief, but because we genuinely do 
doubt it and have reasons to doubt it relevant to our 
inquiry. Let us say that you and I are waiting at Victoria 
station for Fred. The train he is supposed to be arriving on 
comes in, we see a figure getting off the train at the far end 
of the platform, from a distance it looks like Fred - same 
general height and build, trademark trenchcoat, dark hair, 
walks like Fred, etc. You point him out and say, "that looks 
like Fred, but I can't be sure," I reply "yes, at this distance 
its difficult to be sure." The reasons for doubt are that sight 
cannot accurately determine, at long distances, whether 
the fast approaching figure is or is not Fred. Once the 
figure is a few feet away from us, the doubt is dispelled. At 
this point I turn to you and say - "Oh, look it is Fred," but 
you reply, "I still can't be sure." "Why not" I ask with a 
certain amount of incredulity, now if your answer were to 
be - "because my senses have deceived me in the past 
and it is possible that they are deceiving me now"; then 
this is a very different answer from - "because I forgot my 
glasses and without them I can't see anything beyond my 
own nose."  
The reasons for the second doubt depend upon the 
context in which you are currently located; the reasons for 
the first do not. Descartes concedes that his form of doubt 
should not be carried over into practical life. Peirce's point 
is that it is difficult to see what kind of motivation we have 
for an inquiry based on Descartes' method of doubt. 
Wittgenstein agrees with Peirce that there must be 
grounds for doubt: 
“322. What if the pupil refused to believe that this moun-
tain had been there beyond human memory?   
We should say that he had no grounds for this suspicion. 
323. So rational suspicion must have grounds?   
We might also say: ‘the reasonable man believes this’.” 
Peirce tells us that a doubt is something that stimulates an 
inquiry, by unsettling a stable belief; therefore we should 
look for the grounds for doubt in the context of an inquiry. 
Wittgenstein, as we saw in the previous section, tells us 
that the grounds for doubt can be found in that doubt’s 
practical consequences; what difference will the doubt 
make to the way we go on? In 120 Wittgenstein shows the 
idleness of the doubt that a table is still there when nobody 
sees it. He asks us to consider the difference that such a 
doubt would make to our beliefs and practices concerning 
tables. Similarly, Peirce denies that a doubt that has as its 
ground - an evil demon could be deceiving me - makes 
any difference at all to how I might conduct an inquiry. The 
important point that Wittgenstein and Peirce share, is that 
these doubts make no difference to our actual beliefs and 
practices, they have no purchase on them. Which allows 
Peirce and Wittgenstein to consider the more interesting 
question of how genuine doubts do make a difference to 
what we think and do,  
“450. I want to say: Our learning has the form ‘that is a 
violet’, ‘that is a table’. Admittedly, the child might hear 
the word ‘violet’ for the first time in the sentence ‘per-
haps that is a violet’, but then he could ask ‘what is a 
violet?’ Now this might of course be answered by 
showing him a picture. But how would it be if one said 
‘that is a…’ only when showing him a picture, but other-
wise said nothing but ‘perhaps that is a…’- What practi-
cal consequences is that supposed to have?” 
In 450. Wittgenstein shows that a child could not be taught 
to use a word by hearing them as expressions of uncer-
tainty. The practice of showing the child a picture and 
saying “perhaps that is a…” would be an absurd way of 
trying to teach the child how to use a word, it would not be 
a recognisable language game, to us. This presupposes 
that there are language games in which genuine doubt 
plays a role. In paragraphs 310 – 317 Wittgenstein imag-
ines a pupil who continually interrupts his teacher with 
doubts about the existence of things and the meanings of 
words. Just as someone who looks for objects by opening 
a draw, seeing that the object is not there, closing the 
draw, waiting and then opening the draw again has not 
learnt how to look for things; so the pupil who asks 
questions about the existence of objects when nobody is 
looking has not learnt how to ask questions. 
Wittgenstein is calling for us to suppose that in any act 
of doubting there must be grounds for doubt. However, he 
is aware that there is no general rule or guideline which 
determines when a doubt is unreasonable or groundless. 
“452. It would not be reasonable to doubt if that was a 
real tree or only…. My finding it beyond doubt is not 
what counts. If a doubt would be unreasonable, that 
cannot be seen from what I hold. There would therefore 
have to be a rule that declares doubt to be unreasonable 
here. But there isn’t such a rule either.” 
The positive account of doubt shows that particular doubts 
arise in particular contexts, rather than there being an 
absolute rule that determines when doubts are grounded 
or not. This is because, particular doubts occur in parti-
cular contexts. 
4. Doubt Arises in A Context 
Doubting occurs within a language game, not outside of it. 
The act of doubting presupposes the ability to engage in 
such language games and the language games them-
selves presuppose certain characteristics of the act of 
doubting.  
“255. Doubting has certain characteristic manifestations, 
but they are only characteristic of it in particular circum-
stances. If someone said that he doubted the existence 
of his hands, kept looking at them from all sides, tried to 
make sure it wasn’t all done by mirrors, etc. we should 
not be sure whether we ought to call that doubting. We 
might describe his way of behaving as like the behaviour 
of doubt, but his game would not be ours.” 
Wittgenstein goes on to ask how we would convince 
someone who professed to doubt that they had hands or a 
body. What sort of language games would apply here? 
Doubt with grounds and some practical consequence can 
now be seen as being part of the language game of 
doubting, but only relative to particular circumstances. 
Peirce concurs, a genuine doubt has the ability to alter 
our beliefs, whereas sceptical doubts never do. A doubt is 
motivated by a positive reason for holding it, being directed 
at a specific belief. This is why a doubt occurs in a 
particular context and initiates a particular inquiry. Doubt 
presupposes belief and inquiry, without them there could 
be no genuine doubt. 
5. Conclusion 
I have given only a brief sketch of the rich points of 
comparison between Peirce and Wittgenstein. They both 
agree that universal doubts are idle, this is because they 
have no practical consequences, they make no difference 
to the ways in which we would conduct ourselves. Doubts 




require grounds, they must be positive and directed, or 
reasonable. However, there are no hard and fast rules for 
determining grounds for doubt in any particular context. 
But, doubts do arise in a particular context and we do 
recognise them when they stimulate us to consider our 
current beliefs.   
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